Overlooking the mass of revellers outside the Presidential Palace at 5am
on
August 16th, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías made the declaration
that
his followers were waiting for: "The recall referendum was not just a
referendum
on Hugo Chávez," he announced, speaking in the third person, "it was a
referendum of the revolutionary process, and a majority of Venezuelans
articulated their support! It is time to deepen the revolution!"
Thus, Venezuela's experiment in revolution has entered a new phase. The
reaffirmation (as Chavistas have begun calling the recall referendum) of
both
Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution by 60% of the population marks a
historical
moment in the evolution of radical politics in Venezuela. Never before
has
Chávez or 'el proceso' been so widely supported in Venezuela, nor so
widely
accepted - albeit reluctantly - by the international community.
For many, the upcoming regional elections, now tentatively scheduled for
late-October, provide the first opportunity to deepen the revolution.
With the
momentum from the referendum and the opposition in disarray, Chavista
candidates
have the potential to gain important political territory.
Many current members of the opposition in key positions were originally
elected
as Chavista candidates in the regional elections of 2000, only to switch
sides
in 2002-03 when they felt the political winds turning against Chávez.
They
guessed wrong, and may now lose their posts for their base opportunism.
Yet Chavistas stand to do more than merely re-gain positions that
'should' have
been theirs for the last 4 years. The 'No' vote in last month's
referendum-a
vote against recalling Chávez-won in 23 of 24 states, including the 8
states
currently governed by the opposition, though the vote was close in some
cases.
If those who voted 'No' in August, will vote for the Chavista candidate
in
October, this will reinforce the threat to the opposition in these
states.
Yet it is appearing more and more that this may not necessarily be the
case.
Though the opposition as a national conglomeration of anti-Chavists was
roundly
defeated in the referendum, individual candidates for governor and mayor
may
maintain local support. Furthermore, while a large percentage of
Chavistas will
likely vote for the official candidate in the regional elections, there
is also
an unknown number of Chávez-supporters, varying greatly from community
to
community, who may not.
This is a problem with roots deep in the gestation of the practical
defensive-politics that have necessarily dominated in Venezuela since
the
attempted coup against Chávez in April 2002 (if not before). During the
coup,
when the Venezuelan people flooded the streets all over the country, and
hundreds-of-thousands surrounded the palace to demand Chávez' return, a
siege-mentality set in. This mentality was further entrenched in the
following
months when Venezuela's economy was effectively (if temporarily)
destroyed by
the oil-industry shut-down.
The threat to the Bolivarian revolution was especially grave since this
"general
strike" was led by the communion of Venezuela's corporatist union
confederation,
the CTV, and the largest Chamber of Commerce federation; between the two
of them
they were able to effectively shut down oil production for several
months in
2003. No one, least of all the Venezuelan people benefiting from this
revolution, doubted the centrality of oil wealth in making 'el proceso'
possible.
The opposition's identification of Chávez as the embodiment of
everything evil
they associate with this revolution, had the effect of confirming his
uniqueness
and his messianistic status in the eyes of his followers. It was the
incredible
mobilization of 'Chavistas' that deflected or reversed the constant
attacks on
Chávez beginning with the 2002 coup. The effect has been to create a
mobilized
and increasingly radicalized people, who are nevertheless Chavistas
first, and
revolutionaries second.
Chavez has well understood the danger to the revolution posed by this
overemphasis of his own role. Since he came to power his administration
of the
Bolivarian project has aimed at providing people with the tools to carve
an
autonomous, bottom-up path for the revolution. Thus, his focus on
education,
which gives all Venezuelans access from basic literacy to university;
and thus,
his emphasis on community-based power structures.
Yet in the heat of the battle over the last five years, much of this
emphasis on
community-based power structures was put on hold-there were serious
threats to
the revolution itself that understandably took precedence. Moreover,
the
immediacy of facing these threats required-in certain instances-Chávez'
unfiltered leadership. And of course, there is the reality of the
prospective
revolution still being based on a capitalist state that more than
anything has
continued to resemble the corrupt, paralyzed bureaucracy of the pre-1998
(4th
republic) Venezuelan state.
The Current Juncture
How to move beyond the barriers that have so far limited the Bolivarian
project?
How to deepen the revolution even in the context of continuing threats
to its
existence?
How to transcend the pattern of going from one electoral test to the
next, in
favor of permanent revolutionary creativity?
On August 20th, William Izarra-head of the ideology wing of Comando
Maisanta,
the campaign coordination team-held a conference entitled "Deepening the
Bolivarian Revolution." When asked what the role of the Electoral
Battle Units
(UBE) and the 'Patrols' (groups of activists campaigning for the 'No'
vote in
the referendum) would be now that the referendum was over, Izarra
responded:
"Right now we don't have any specifics, but the patrols and the UBEs
will
continue as electoral battalions. More than that, it is not yet
clear...we
don't have more specifics."
Yet the members of the UBEs and the patrols are not waiting for the
National
Comando Maisanta to give them direction-the answers to the above
questions are
being debated now, in communities across the country. And what
consensus has so
far emerged appears to be clear on at least one front: any deepening of
democracy must begin now; it cannot wait for after the regional
elections.
As a result, a series of plans are emerging as to how to create the
participatory structures and coordination that will form the foundation
upon
which this new stage of the revolution is launched. This debate has
been given
a special urgency due to conflicts surrounding candidates in the
regional
elections-with disagreement over municipal candidates front-and-centre.
The experience of the 2000 regional elections clarified for many the
need for an
alternative, consistent method of selecting candidates. Yet last April
when the
election date was declared (though the date has since been changed
twice),
instead of primaries, candidates were selected by the Comando Ayacucho -
the
disastrous predecessor to the Comando Maisanta. The need for primaries
was
raised, due to the Comando's apparent preference for candidates that
appeared to
fit their rigid definition of chavismo, as opposed to those candidates
who
actually have a base in the communities in question. As a result many
Chavista
candidates decided to run anyway-on a Chavista platform, but against the
official Chavista candidates.
In order for the Chavistas to take full advantage of the regional
elections,
unity is key. To avoid splitting the vote another mechanism for
selecting
candidates must be developed (and implemented). Unfortunately, instead
of
learning from the reluctance of the base and their candidates to give up
their
electoral ambitions simply because the Comando Ayacucho told them to,
Chávez
seems to be repeating the same mistake. In last Sunday's weekly
television
address Alô Presidente, Chávez declared "We have already announced the
candidates, and these are the candidates. Those who don't want unity
can join
the escualidos (opposition)."
Meanwhile several exciting, innovative examples of grassroots
initiatives are
emerging to solve this problem. Below, two brief examples illustrate
two
different approaches.
Primaries
In one municipality in the interior in which various Chavista
mayoral-candidates
decided to work together to consult the community, they created a
commission
made up of agreed-upon members to organize the following three-stage
process of
consultation:
First, they would call a popular assembly in which each candidate would
present
his platform to the public. Second, they would conduct a poll, which
due to
time constraints, would be limited to those sectors who had shown the
highest
levels of support for Chávez in the referendum. Third, they would call
another
popular assembly in which supporters of each candidate would make a
brief
presentation to give the commission an idea of each candidate's
support-base.
Only after this process of consultation would the commission evaluate
the
results of each stage of the process, and pronounce in favour of a
single
candidate, at which point the remaining members would be incorporated
into the
winner's campaign to foster unity.
Popular Participation
The second example comes from a Caracas-barrio, and Chavista-bastion.
Here
residents decided to support the official Chavista candidate, but
conditionally.
They have planned the "First Municipal Forum of Popular Participation:
Constructing Popular Power," a 3-day conference at which
community-members will
conduct a series of workshops and hold debates designed to produce a
manifesto
outlining the specific advances in popular power deemed most pressing.
The
manifesto will then be presented to the official Chavista candidate to
sign, as
a condition for the support of the community.
Closing the Gap
Yet Chávez's most recent declaration seems to contradict these vibrant
examples
of participatory consultative politics. And the existence of other such
experiments in institutionalizing popular participation in the selection
of
candidates suggests a dangerous disconnect between Chávez and his
supporters.
This disconnect is not entirely new; it has existed in one form or
another since
Chávez first came to power. However, the debate over the regional
elections may
well be the first time it is forcefully vocalized. If the goal is to
deepen the
participatory politics that form the rhetorical basis of the Bolivarian
revolution-indeed to transfer these politics from rhetoric to
reality-then there
is no choice but to support each individual community's right to choose
their
own candidate (just as it is their right to vote for or against that
candidate).
Up until last Sunday's program, Chávez was more aware of the abyss
separating
him from his people than anyone. The very idea of a democratic
revolution means
that, at least initially, all that is achieved with an electoral victory
is
leadership of the state. But it doesn't yet suggest, nor is it possible
for it
to yet include, fundamental change in the state itself. Transforming
the state
is perhaps the most strategic accomplishment the revolution can hope to
achieve,
and it is one that will remain out of reach until the Venezuelan people
have
been mobilized to having fully institutionalized their right to
participate in
politics at every level of government-and beyond. That is to say, until
they
have internalized their right to participate in politics not only at the
level
of their community, state, or nation; but also at a regional, and even
international, level.
Every advance in participatory democracy since Chávez was elected-and
they have
often been realized through his direct influence-was designed to close
this gap.
The educational, health, and employment missions all represent a form of
'parallelism' designed to bypass existing state structures that are
intrinsically unable to act as conduits for revolutionary
transformation.
If that pattern is to continue, the debate over candidates demands
public
articulation, and official response. As the arena in which this debate
will
likely play out, the upcoming regional elections may, ironically,
represent the
most profound test of the Bolivarian revolution since the April 2002
coup. Not
for Venezuelan society as a whole, but as a focal point of debates
within Chavismo. At stake is the Bolivarian revolution's ability to transcend
defending Chávez, in favour of advancing the revolution itself; to make
the
transition from one stage in the revolution to another; to move from
Chavismo
towards revolution.
