For more than two centuries, since its emergence from the French revolution,
the political left has been in conflict with religion. From the epic 19th
century struggle of republicans against clericalism to the militant atheism
of 20th century communism, leftwing movements regarded organised religion as
a pivotal prop of the established order, an ally of the powers that be from
tsarist Russia to Tibet.
And as children of the enlightenment, the bulk
of the left saw religious belief itself as little more than a superstitious
hangover from the pre-scientific age, preaching social deference - the rich
man in his castle, the poor man at his gate - while diverting the oppressed
from collective action in the here and now to the hope of justice in the
afterlife. This was the background against which Spanish priests were
targeted as cheerleaders of Francoite fascism in the 30s, while Soviet
churches were turned into museums of atheism and Enver Hoxha decreed the
outright abolition of religion in Maoist Albania in the 60s.
But many of the conditions that gave rise to
earlier leftwing hostility to religion have eroded, as religion itself has
declined in Europe and elsewhere. The bonds between religious institutions
and ruling elites have been weakened, while the radical strands within
religion - which were always present, not least in the core religious texts
themselves - have grown stronger, typified by the egalitarian Christian
liberation theology movement. Even the most established religious
authorities have become sharply critical of the global system, challenging
inequality and western military aggression. During the 1990s the Pope, who
played such a central role in the rollback of communism, was one of the few
international figures who could be heard speaking out against the new
capitalist order. Religion cannot but find itself in conflict with the
demands of an ever more voracious capitalism to dominate social and personal
life, which religion has traditionally seen as its own sphere of influence.
Of course, shifts within religion have not only
been in one direction: from Vatican opposition to contraception in
Aids-blighted Africa, the rise of Hindu nationalism or the advance of
rightwing US evangelicals, there have also been negative trends. But the
loosening of the link between religion and state and economic power has
allowed the secular left to work with the religious in a way that was far
more difficult in the past.
It is the insurgent spirit of political Islam,
however, that has brought the issue of how progressive movements should
relate to religion to a head. Modern Islamism has flourished on the back of
the failures of the left and secular nationalists in the Muslim world and
has increasingly drawn its support from the poor and marginalised. That has
had an impact on the outlook of Islamist groups that not long ago were
backed by the west as conservative ballast for its client states in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, Muslims find themselves at the sharpest end of
conflict with the new imperial world order, from Iraq and Afghanistan to
Chechnya, central Asia and Saudi Arabia - subject to invasion, occupation
and western-backed tyranny unparalleled in any other part of the globe.
Across western Europe, Muslims are the target of an unprecedented level of
hostility and attacks, while segregated at the bottom of the social
hierarchy - now forming, for example, the majority of the prison population
in France.
But for showing solidarity and working with
Muslim organisations - whether in the anti-war movement or in campaigns
against Islamophobia - leftwing groups and politicians such as the London
mayor, Ken Livingstone, are now routinely damned by liberal secularists
(many of whom have been keen supporters of the war in Iraq) for "betraying
the enlightenment" and making common cause with "Islamofascists", homophobes
and misogynists. The pitch of these denunciations has been heightened
further by the government's plan to introduce a new criminal offence of
incitement to religious hatred. This measure would extend to the most
vulnerable community in the country the very modest protection already
offered by race hate legislation to black people, Jews, Sikhs and all
religious communities in Northern Ireland. It is not a new blasphemy law; it
would not lead to a ban on Monty Python's Life of Brian film; or rule out
jokes about Ayatollah Khomeini's contact lenses; or cover ridicule or
attacks on any religion (unlike the broader Australian legislation) - but
would only outlaw incitement of hatred against people because of their
faith.
Many arguments now deployed against this
proposal by an unholy alliance of evangelical Christians, xenophobes, the
British National Party, secular literalists and libertarians were also used
against anti-racist legislation in the 60s and 70s. And none of the public
opposition seems to have included the consequent logical demand that
protection for Jews, Sikhs and religious people in Northern Ireland be
repealed, which only underlines the noxious nature of debate about Islam in
Britain.
At its most rational, opposition to protection
for Muslims and other religious groups is based on the argument that whereas
race is about biology, religion is a set of ideas which can be adopted or
discarded at will. But in reality, just as ethnicity isn't mainly an issue
of genetics, religion isn't only a question of beliefs: both are also about
culture and identity. In Britain, religion has increasingly become a proxy
for race. It hasn't escaped the attention of racists that many people in
Britain who a generation ago would have regarded themselves as Pakistani or
Bangladeshi now see themselves primarily as Muslims - nor that targeting
Muslims is a way round existing race hate legislation, as well as drawing on
the most poisonous prejudices and conflict of our era.
By the same token, for the secular left - which
is about social justice and solidarity if it is about anything - not to have
stood with British Muslims over Islamophobia or the invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq would have been the real betrayal. It is not, and has not been, in
any way necessary to compromise with social conservatism over women's or gay
rights, say, to have such an engagement; on the contrary, dialogue can
change both sides in positive ways. But it is a chronic flaw of liberalism
to fail to recognise power inequalities in social relations - and the
attitude of some liberals to contemporary Islam reflects that blindness in
spades.
Outright opposition to religion was important
in its time. But to fetishise traditional secularism in our time is to fail
to understand its changing social meaning. Like nationalism, religion can
face either way, playing a progressive or reactionary role. The crucial
struggle is now within religion rather than against it.
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